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I. INTRODUCTION
City of Norwood v. Horney,1 a unanimous opinion authored by

* The author of this Article, Kathleen M. Trafford, is a partner at Porter, Wright, Morris, & Arthur,
LLP and chairs its Appellate and Ohio Supreme Court Practice Group. She is a Fellow of the
American College of Trial Lawyers and a past president of the Columbus Bar Association. She
attended the University of Akron School of Law for two years and received her juris doctorate from
Capital University School of Law in 1979.
1. City of Norwood v. Horney (“Norwood”), 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853
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Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor in 2006, is well known for its holdings
on eminent domain. But, as important as its eminent domain holdings
are, there is much more to the Norwood opinion. Indeed, Norwood is
every bit as important for its articulation of fundamental principles
governing the constitutional role of the judiciary in modern times.
Norwood recalibrates the balance thought to be struck in the Ohio
Constitution between an individual’s inalienable right to acquire and
possess property and the need to protect the public welfare.2 It does so
by declaring that “economic or financial benefit alone is insufficient to
satisfy the public use requirement” established in article I, section 19 of
the Ohio Constitution and that “any taking based solely on financial gain
is void as a matter of law.”3 This holding tips the scale toward giving
broader protection to individual property rights after several decades of
case law allowing greater latitude for governmental takings. The Ohio
Supreme Court’s holding concerned a significant point of law rendered
early in the legal, social, and cultural debates over the use of eminent
domain to seize property so that it could be transformed into a more
lucrative tax base. However, the broader significance of Norwood lies in
its discussion of three important principles that the Court reaffirmed and
sharpened before reaching its holding on takings.
First, Norwood followed closely on the heels of Kelo v. New
London,4 in which the United States Supreme Court upheld a taking of
individual property for purely economic reasons5 as not violative of the
federal Fifth Amendment.6 The Ohio Supreme Court, however, was not
cowed by the High Court’s ruling nor persuaded by its analysis. By
breaking company with the United States Supreme Court and grounding
its analysis almost exclusively on the Ohio Constitution and Ohio

N.E.2d 1115.
2. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 1 states: “All men . . . have certain inalienable rights, among which
are those of . . . acquiring, possessing and protecting property.” OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19 states:
Private property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the public welfare. When
taken in time of war or other public exigency, imperatively requiring its immediate seizure or for the purpose of making or repairing roads, which shall be open to the public,
without charge, a compensation shall be made to the owner, in money, and in all other
cases, where private property shall be taken for public use, a compensation therefor shall
first be made in money, or first secured by a deposit of money; and such compensation
shall be assessed by a jury, without deduction for benefits to any property of the owner.
3. Norwood, 2006-Ohio-3799 at ¶ 80.
4. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
5. Id. at 485.
6. “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend.
V.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss1/3

2

Trafford: Much More Than Eminent Domain

2015]

MUCH MORE THAN EMINENT DOMAIN

37

values7, the Court took a step forward in establishing the principle of
Ohio constitutional independence and moving the Court more solidly
into the New Judicial Federalism camp.8
Second, the Court made clear, in no uncertain terms, that the
determination of what constitutes a “public use” for purposes of an Ohio
takings clause analysis is a judicial question.9 While acknowledging that
some deference to legislative findings is appropriate, the opinion leaves
no doubt that judicial review of whether the public use requirement has
been satisfied cannot be accomplished by “superficial scrutiny” or
reduced to “hortatory fluff.”10 Norwood is, in this regard, an important
separation-of-powers opinion that likely will affect how the Court
balances legislative and judicial authority in areas other than eminent
domain.
Third, the Court breathed new life into the dormant, if not dead,
void-for-vagueness doctrine. Norwood makes clear that the doctrine still
has utility in eminent domain cases11 and suggests that it may have
utility in other cases in which a civil statute affects fundamental
constitutional rights.12
This Article will argue that the Norwood opinion not only enhances
the individual’s protection under Ohio’s eminent domain law but also
refines the judiciary’s approach to Ohio constitutional analysis. Part I
will set forth the pre-Norwood standard of review in Ohio eminent
domain law, which took an increasingly expansive approach to
determining what constitutes public use out of deference to the
legislature. It will outline the standard of review for eminent domain
cases at the federal level following the United States Supreme Court’s
holding in Kelo, which upheld the taking of private property for purely
economic reasons. Finally, Part I discusses the facts and holding of
Norwood, which struck down the taking of private property for purely
7. Norwood, 2006-Ohio-3799 at ¶ 9.
8. “New Judicial Federalism” refers to a movement that emerged in the 1970s advocating
the “renewed reliance by state courts on state constitutions as independent sources of constitutional
rights, often with the aim of extending greater protection to individual liberties than is available
under current interpretations of the federal constitution.” Mary Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr, The
New Judicial Federalism and the Ohio Supreme Court: Anatomy of a Failure, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 143,
143 (1984); see also Robert F. Williams, The New Judicial Federalism in Ohio: The First Decade,
51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 415, 423 (2004); Richard A. Saphire, Ohio Constitutional Interpretation, 51
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 437, 443 (2004); Marianna Brown Bettman, Ohio Joins the New Judicial
Federalism Movement: A Little To-ing and a Little Fro-ing, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 491, 491 (2004).
9. Norwood, 2006-Ohio-3799 at ¶ 67.
10. Id. at ¶ 66.
11. Id. at ¶ 88.
12. Id.
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economic reasons on the authority of the Ohio Constitution. Part II will
explore how the Norwood opinion exemplifies Ohio constitutional
independence and New Judicial Federalism by grounding its analysis in
the Ohio Constitution and departing from the federal paradigm. Part III
will consider how Norwood affects judicial deference to legislative
authority, given the fine line between judicial deference and judicial
abdication and the Court’s emphasis on separation of powers. Finally,
Part IV will discuss the legislative clarity required under Norwood’s use
of the rarely invoked void-for-vagueness doctrine.
II. ANALYSIS
A.

Norwood Rebalances the Takings Scale
1. Pre-Norwood Standards of Review in Ohio Eminent Domain
Law

Two of the significant aspects of Norwood are its reliance on the
protections within the Ohio Constitution, rather than federal
constitutional protections,13 and Chief Justice O’Connor’s adamant
insistence that judicial review of takings is commensurate with the
fundamental right to property that is at issue in takings cases.14 Prior to
Norwood, Ohio eminent domain law increasingly favored the legislative
right to take private property for the “public welfare” by broadly
expanding the notion of what constitutes a public use and giving
increased deference to legislative determinations of public use. Three
points along the continuum show this evolution of the law before
Norwood brought it to its current state.
In the early twentieth century case of Pontiac Improvement
Company v. Board of Commissioners, the Ohio Supreme Court held that
a public corporation could not use the power of eminent domain to assert
regulatory control over private property in the absence of either a
physical taking or compensation.15 The case came before the Court after
the Cleveland Metropolitan Park District (District) successfully
prosecuted an appropriation suit to acquire, in fee simple, a portion of an
entire tract of private property and to assert ongoing control over the
remainder of the property without further compensation.16
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at ¶ 65.
Id. at ¶ 69.
Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 135 N.E. 635, 641 (Ohio 1922).
Id. at 636.
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The District’s goal was to build a park on the parcel acquired from
the owner and create a park-like appearance on the adjacent parcel by
asserting the right to control plantings, grading, and drainage on the
property and the right to prevent the owner from placing buildings,
fences, poles, signs, or other structures on the property.17 The District
claimed it had the right to assert this type of regulatory taking because
the Ohio Legislature had authorized metropolitan park boards to exercise
the power of eminent domain to acquire not only fee interests but also
“any lesser interest . . . as the board may deem advisable.”18 Both the
trial court and the court of appeals found in favor of the District, but the
Ohio Supreme Court reversed.19
The Court strictly construed article I, section 19 of the Ohio
Constitution, stating, “[i]t is very clear that the purpose of the
constitution was to safeguard the rights of private property and to
preserve it to the owner, except where it ‘shall be taken for a public
use.’”20 The Court concluded that “[t]he natural import of the words,
‘taken for public use,’ used in our constitution is that the thing is to be
used by the public or by some agency of the public.”21 The Court found
that the phrase, “taken for public use,” “implies possession, occupation
and enjoyment of the property by the public, or by public agencies, to be
used for public purposes.”22 Although the Court’s analysis was
predominantly textual and focused on interpreting the phrase, “taken for
a public use,” the Court was not inattentive to the property owner’s
interests. Indeed, the Court expressed a genuine concern that allowing
the type of indefinite, uncompensated regulatory takings intended by the
District left too much uncertainty and confusion regarding the property
owner’s ongoing rights and privileges.23
17. Id. at 637-38.
18. Id. at 637.
19. Id. at 641.
20. Id. at 638. While the prefatory sentence in article I, section 19 places private property
“subservient to the public welfare,” the “taken for a public use” language was added as a result of
the amendment to the Ohio Constitution in 1891 that describes how compensation is to be
determined and paid when the power of eminent domain is exercised.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 635. The Court acknowledged that, under the weight of existing judicial authority, a
taking may be made by a private entity to serve the public with some necessity or convenience, or
even by a private individual to enable him or her to cultivate the land or carry on a business that
could not otherwise be done. However, it held that in all such instances, there must be “an actual
taking of the land, or an acquisition of an easement in the land, a going upon and acquiring either a
fee or lesser interest.” Id. at 639.
23. Id. at 640 (“It does not appear that any provision has been made concerning the method
of exercising these rights to control, regulate and prevent the various matters stated in the petition,
nor does it appear how they are to be enforced, nor how often they may be altered, nor what notice
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The Court’s strict interpretation of article I, section 19 to require an
actual taking for a public use, however, did not withstand the test of
time. Three decades later, in State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich, the Court
overruled that branch of the Pontiac Improvement holding24 and
substituted a broad interpretation of the government’s eminent domain
power for an interpretation that was more protective of individuals’
property rights.25
The issue in Bruestle was whether the taking of property for urban
redevelopment is a public use for which the power of eminent domain
may be exercised.26 The redevelopment plan at issue contemplated the
use of eminent domain power by a city to acquire all the property in a
blighted area for the purpose of demolishing existing buildings and
reselling the property to private developers for redevelopment.27 The
plan envisioned continuing restrictions on the redevelopment effort to
guard against the recurrence of blight.28
The Court rejected the argument that the constitutional “public use”
requirement meant “there must be a use or right of use on the part of the
public or some limited portion thereof,” finding that such an argument
ignored the first sentence of article I, section 19 of the Ohio
Constitution, which renders private property “subservient to the public
welfare.”29 The Court held that property taken for the public welfare is
property taken for a public use, even when there may be an incidental
nonpublic use of the property or benefit of the taking.30 The Court
summarily dismissed the notion that the elimination of slums and
initiation of provisions to guard against the recurrence of blight is not
conducive to the public welfare.31
Bruestle also sent a strong signal that, going forward, the Court
would defer to legislative findings as to whether property was taken for

must be given to the owner of the property who remains in possession, nor whether he shall have a
right to be heard touching the various matters. The uncertainty, confusion and contention that would
necessarily arise are very apparent”).
24. State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich, 110 N.E.2d 778, 780 (Ohio 1953). See also id. at 786
(citing Pontiac Improvement Co., 135 N.E. at 635) (concluding that the syllabus of Pontiac
Improvement Co. “appears to be contrary to the intention expressed by the people by the words used
in Section 19 of Article I of the Constitution and inconsistent with other pronouncements of this
court”).
25. Id. at 787-88.
26. Id. at 784.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 780-81.
29. Id. at 785.
30. Id. at 780.
31. Id. at 787.
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the public welfare and not overturn those determinations unless they
were found to be “manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable” – the same
level of deference applied to municipal spending decisions.32 Yet, by
importing into the eminent domain context the test applied to municipal
spending decisions,33 the Bruestle Court failed to acknowledge the
critical difference between the power of eminent domain and the power
to tax and spend: the former affects an inalienable right, while the latter
does not.34
The signal sent in Bruestle was amplified in AAAA Enterprises, Inc.
v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp.35 There, the
Court held that the abuse-of-discretion standard applies to judicial
review of a legislative determination that an area is a “blighted area”
appropriate for exercise of the power of eminent domain.36 The Court
rejected the view that to satisfy that standard the property owner must
come forward with evidence of subjective bad faith but, nevertheless,
held that the property owner had to clear the high hurdle of showing that
the legislative determination was “unreasonable, arbitrary or
unconscionable.”37 Even this modified abuse-of-discretion standard,
however, gives inordinate weight to the legislative public-welfare
determination and significantly discounts the value of the inalienable
right to acquire, possess, and protect private property. The standard
invoked in AAAA Enterprises is routinely and appropriately applied to
any number of discretionary governmental decisions that do not invade
fundamental constitutional rights.38 Where governmental action invades
a fundamental right, however, the courts have typically applied a
heightened standard of review.39
32. Id.
33. Id. (citing State ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes, 100 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1951)).
34. Article 1, section 1 of the Ohio Constitution deems the acquisition, possession, and
protection of property an “inalienable” right. Similarly, the Norwood opinion characterizes property
rights as “fundamental.” See Norwood, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115, at
¶ 38; see also note 65 infra and accompanying text.
35. AAAA Enter., Inc. v. River Place Cmty Urban Redevelopment Corp., 553 N.E.2d 597
(Ohio 1990).
36. Id. at 600.
37. Id. at 601.
38. See, e.g., State v. Schreckengost, 282 N.E.2d 50, 53 (Ohio 1972) (noting that an abuseof-discretion standard applied to the state legislature’s decision to vest authority in the Division of
Parks and Recreation to create regulations to govern parks without providing guidelines for such
regulations).
39. See generally State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 865 (Ohio 2001) (Cook, J., concurring).
Legislation that affects a fundamental right is generally subject to strict scrutiny; that is, it “must be
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.” Id. at 866 (citing Reno v. Flores,
507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993)).
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The Court’s increasing willingness to defer to the legislature
mirrored the progression of federal eminent domain law.40 Federal courts
also deferred to the legislature, noting that the role of the judiciary in
reviewing legislative findings is “an extremely narrow one”41 and that
courts should “not substitute its judgment for a legislature’s judgment as
to what constitutes a public use ‘unless the use be palpably without
reasonable foundation.’”42
2. Standards of Review in Federal Eminent Domain Law
The consequences of lowering the bar for judicial review in
eminent domain cases were dramatically brought home in Kelo v. New
London, decided by a sharply divided United States Supreme Court
merely six months before Norwood was argued before the Ohio Supreme
Court.43 Kelo put forth the issue of whether a municipality could take
unblighted private property solely for the purpose of economic
development44 – the same issue that the Court would take up in
Norwood.45
The economically distressed city of New London adopted a
comprehensive development plan projected to create jobs, increase
revenue, and substantially revitalize the development area, which
included downtown and waterfront areas on the Long Island Sound in
southern Connecticut.46 In order to implement the plan, the city
reactivated the New London Development Corporation, a private
nonprofit entity, and authorized it to acquire property in the 90-acre
development area by purchase or eminent domain.47 Owners of 15 of the
properties in the area refused to sell their homes or businesses – none of
which were blighted or in poor condition – and challenged the city’s
delegation of eminent domain power to the private corporation on the
40. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482 (2005) (noting federal precedent had
developed a deferential approach to legislative determinations in this area).
41. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
42. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (quoting United States v.
Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
43. Norwood was first argued on September 28, 2005, with argument limited to the
constitutionality of the provision in R.C. 163.19 prohibiting courts from enjoining an appropriation
after compensation for the property is deposited with the court but prior to appellate review. On
January 11, 2006, the Court heard argument on the broader issue of the constitutionality of taking
private property by eminent domain and transferring the property to a private entity for
redevelopment.
44. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477.
45. Norwood, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115, at ¶ 7.
46. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472.
47. Id. at 473-75.
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ground that taking private property for the purpose of economic
development violated the public use restriction in the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.48
The Court declined the petitioners’ invitation to adopt a bright-line
rule that economic development does not qualify as a public use,
invoking the Court’s long-standing deference to legislative
determinations of which public needs justify the use of the takings
power and its own traditionally broad understanding of public purpose to
find that the “plan unquestionably serves a public purpose.”49 While the
majority believed its holding was readily predictable from over a century
of Supreme Court case law interpreting the Takings Clause,50 the four
dissenters found it an astonishing abandonment of “long-held, basic
limitations on governmental power” that effectively deleted the public
use requirement from the federal Takings Clause.51 The four dissenting
justices read the majority’s opinion as making all private property
vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner,
simply because it might be upgraded in a manner that a legislative body
deems more beneficial to the public.52
Kelo provoked caustic criticism and debate about eminent domain
abuse and was a call to action for state legislatures and courts across the
country.53 Ohio was poised to enter the post-Kelo arena because the
Ohio Supreme Court had already accepted Norwood for review.
3. Setting the Stage for Constitutional Consideration
Norwood, an island completely surrounded by the city of
Cincinnati, was a thriving city with a strong industrial base and
desirable, low-density residential communities until the late 1960s when
the city was transected by construction of Interstate 71 (I-71).54 The I-71
construction truncated numerous residential streets, eliminated houses,
and changed the character of many neighborhoods, including the area in
the vicinity of Madison and Edwards Roads where the Horneys and their
neighbors lived.55 This later became the Edwards Road Urban Renewal
48. Id. at 469.
49. Id. at 484.
50. Id. at 490.
51. Id. at 494.
52. Id.
53. Julia D. Mahony, Kelo’s Legacy: Eminent Domain and the Forfeiture of Property Rights,
2005 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 104 (2006).
54. City of Norwood v. Horney (“Norwood II”), 161 Ohio App. 3d 316, 2005-Ohio-2448,
830 N.E.2d 381, at ¶¶ 7-8.
55. Id.
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Area.56
In 2002, a private developer approached the city of Norwood (City)
and proposed to redevelop the area into a conglomerate of higher density
residential areas, retail and office spaces, and large public parking
facilities.57 The City supported the redevelopment proposal but declined
to use its power of eminent domain to assist the developer in acquiring
the properties to be redeveloped.58
Subsequently, the developer successfully acquired all but five of the
necessary parcels and renewed its plea to the City to acquire the
remaining properties through appropriation.59 The City acquiesced,
commissioning an urban renewal study to determine whether the area
that included the properties to be acquired was a “‘slum, blighted, or
deteriorated’ or ‘deteriorating’” as required by statute.60 The study
concluded that the construction of I-71 and resulting commercialization
of the area had a negative effect on the area as a residential community
and that piecemeal redevelopment was likely to occur, which would
have an “adverse effect on the physical, aesthetic, and functional
qualities of the area.”61
In August 2003, the Norwood City Council passed an ordinance “to
eliminate deteriorating and deteriorated areas within the City of
Norwood and to improve safety and traffic conditions and other
deteriorating conditions” by “encouraging their prompt redevelopment”
along with a companion ordinance authorizing the mayor to contract
with the private developer for the redevelopment of the area.62 The
following month, City Council authorized the use of the power of
eminent domain to acquire the remaining parcels owned by the Horneys
and their neighbors.63
In the appropriation cases that followed, the property owners
asserted the City had abused its discretion in determining that the
renewal area was a “deteriorating” area over which the power of eminent
domain could be lawfully exercised.64 The trial court disagreed,
approved the appropriation of the properties, and declined to enjoin the

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.; Norwood, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115, at ¶ 14.
Norwood II, 2005-Ohio-2448 at ¶ 9.
Id. at ¶ 10.
Id. at ¶ 11.
Id. at ¶ 11.
Id. at ¶ 12.
Id.
Id. at ¶¶ 2-3.
Id. at ¶ 5.
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developer from using or destroying the properties pending appeal.65
In May 2005, the First District Court of Appeals affirmed. Both the
trial court and the court of appeals felt constrained to uphold City
Council’s determination that the area was “deteriorating” by the
deference required to be given such legislative judgments under prior
precedent.66 The court of appeals read AAAA Enterprises as requiring the
court to “give the definition of ‘blighted area’ a liberal interpretation”
and believed its “role in determining whether governmental power has
been exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.”67 The
court of appeals understood AAAA Enterprises and Bruestle as broadly
holding “that a taking under an urban renewal plan is for a valid public
purpose and is constitutional.”68
4. The Norwood Decision
The Ohio Supreme Court unanimously disagreed with the court of
appeals’ reading of its precedents as well as the result on the merits.69
The Norwood decision assures that, in Ohio, property owners do not
have to live under the Kelo threat that their homes or other property can
be taken simply because some other party might put the property to a
“better” use that conceivably furthers the “public welfare.”
Chief Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court explained, citing
150 years of precedent, that “Ohio has always considered the right of
property to be a fundamental right” and that “the bundle of venerable
rights associated with property is strongly protected by the Ohio
Constitution and must be trod upon lightly no matter how great the
weight of other forces.”70 The Court acknowledged that the concept of
65. Norwood, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115, at ¶ 31. The court of
appeals also denied a stay, finding that R.C. 163.19 prohibited such relief. The Ohio Supreme Court
issued an order on February 22, 2005, enjoining any further destruction or alteration of the
properties pending the appeal on the merits. City of Norwood v. Horney, 105 Ohio St. 3d 1445,
2005-Ohio-669, 822 N.E.2d 1261. The Court ultimately held the anti-injunction provision in R.C.
169.13 unconstitutional as an infringement on inherent judicial authority. Norwood, 2006-Ohio3799 at ¶ 123.
66. Norwood, 2006-Ohio-3799 at ¶ 26 (quoting trial court opinion); see also Norwood II,
2005-Ohio-2448 at ¶¶ 27-28.
67. Norwood II, 2005-Ohio-2448 at ¶ 31.
68. Id. at ¶ 44.
69. Norwood, 2006-Ohio-3799 at ¶ 63.
70. Id. at ¶ 38 (citing Reece v. Kyle, 31 N.E. 747, 750 (Ohio 1892), overruled in part on
other grounds; Mahoning Cty. Bar Ass’n v. Ruffalo, 199 N.E.2d 396 (Ohio 1964); Hatch v.
Buckeye State Bldg. & Loan Co., 16 Ohio Law Abs. 661 (1934); In re Vine St. Congregational
Church, 20 Ohio Dec. 573 (1910); Caldwell v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co., 14 Ohio Dec. 375
(1904); Kata v. Second Nat’l Bank of Warren, 271 N.E.2d 292 (Ohio 1971)).
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public use had evolved into a broad and flexible standard, exemplified
by its holding in Bruestle that “a taking of blighted property for purposes
of redevelopment was within the broad and inclusive concept of public
use.”71 The Court, however, saw two critical distinctions in the case
before it: (1) the properties were not blighted, and (2) the contemplated
use of the property was dependent upon a private party.72 These
distinctions led the Court to define the issue before it as whether “an
economic or financial benefit alone” is sufficient to satisfy the public use
requirement of the Ohio Constitution; the Court then reached the swift,
sure, and unanimous conclusion that it is not.73
The Norwood decision rebalanced the takings scale by withdrawing
the judicial thumb, placed there under prior law in the form of judicial
deference, and by allowing the property owners’ pan to naturally weigh
against the legislature’s pan. Nevertheless, as discussed below, Norwood
has broad import well beyond its public use holding and is likely to
affect the development of the law in other substantive areas.
B.

Norwood Invigorates the Court’s Commitment to Ohio
Constitutional Independence

Norwood has significance beyond its immediate holding because
the Court takes an independent constitutional stance by rejecting Kelo
and using the Ohio Constitution to safeguard individual property rights
not recognized under federal law. It is one of only a few cases in which
the Ohio Supreme Court has invoked state constitutional independence
to reach an outcome different from federal law in a non-criminal case.
Over the last 40 years, courts, judges, lawyers, and scholars have
increasingly recognized the potential of state constitutions to provide
greater protection for individual rights and liberties than the federal
Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. The
birth of this “New Judicial Federalism” movement is traced to Justice
William J. Brennan’s call to arms to cure what he saw as the
depreciation of federal constitutional protections, particularly those
protecting the rights of criminal defendants, due to the growing
conservatism of the United States Supreme Court at that time.74 The
71. Id. at ¶ 59.
72. Id. at ¶¶ 62, 71.
73. Id. at ¶ 80.
74. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) (“State courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens
the full protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual
liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s
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movement, as matured over time, however, is not viewed as either
“liberal” or “conservative” but rather as recognizing, appreciating, and
advocating state constitutions as an independent source of fundamental
law that can place a wide array of individual rights and liberties on a
level higher than the federal constitutional floor.75
Ohio officially joined the New Judicial Federalism movement in
Arnold v. City of Cleveland, in which the Court was called on to decide
the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance banning the possession
and sale of assault weapons.76 Presumably, because the question whether
individuals have a fundamental right to bear arms under the United
States Constitution had already been decided in the negative,77 Arnold
asserted that the ordinance violated the fundamental right to bear arms
under article I, section 4 of the Ohio Constitution.78 The Court openly
embraced the notion that it was free to interpret the Ohio Constitution –
a document of “independent force” – to provide greater civil liberties
and protections to individuals and groups than required by the federal
constitutional “floor.”79 The Court analyzed the text of article I, section 4
of the Ohio Constitution, contrasted it with the Second Amendment to
the United States Constitution, and found the Ohio provision broader in
that it “secures to every person a fundamental individual right to bear
arms for ‘their defense and security.’”80 The Court held that the right to
bear arms was a fundamental right under the Ohio Constitution, although
not an absolute right.81 While the defendant in Arnold made the case for
Ohio constitutional independence, he ultimately did not prevail, as the
Court held that the ordinance was a proper exercise of the police power
interpretation of federal law); Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 121 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“[S]tate courts and legislatures are, as a matter of state law, increasingly according
protections once provided as federal rights but now increasingly depreciated by decisions of this
Court.”).
75. See generally Robert F. Williams, Why State Constitutions Matter, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV.
901 (2011); Jeffrey S. Sutton, Why Teach—and Why Study—State Constitutional Law, 34 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 165 (2009).
76. Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 164 (Ohio 1993). Although Arnold
represents the first overt statement of the New Judicial Federalism in Ohio law, the Ohio Supreme
Court had, on several prior occasions, interpreted the Ohio constitutional provisions more broadly
than their federal counterparts. See Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570, 573-74 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1993) (collecting cases).
77. Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 166 (collecting cases).
78. “The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and security; but standing
armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not be kept; and the military shall be in
strict subordination to the civil power.” OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4.
79. Arnold, 616 N.E.2d at 169.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 171.
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and did not violate article I, section 4.82
Notwithstanding the Court’s pronouncement in Arnold that it was
joining the New Judicial Federalism movement,83 the occasions on
which the Court has asserted constitutional independence since Arnold
have been few and far between. In State v. Robinette, the Court declined
to hold that the Ohio Constitution gives greater protection against
searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment of the federal
Constitution, even though the Court initially believed that greater
protection was warranted.84
The question in Robinette I was whether police officers are
constitutionally required to inform citizens validly detained for a traffic
offense that they are “free to go” before the officer attempts to engage in
a consensual interrogation.85 The Court initially held that a “free to go”
statement was required as a matter of both federal and Ohio
constitutional law.86 The state of Ohio appealed this ruling to the United
States Supreme Court.87 The High Court reversed as to the United States
Constitution, stating that the Fourth Amendment does not require such a
statement, and that it was reluctant to apply “bright-line” tests in
determining whether searches are valid.88 The Court remanded the case
back to the Ohio Supreme Court for it to determine whether the
statement was required solely as a matter of state constitutional law.89
On remand, the Ohio Supreme Court elected to conform Ohio law to
federal law even though it previously held that such statements were
required under its interpretation of the federal and Ohio Constitutions.90
Although the Robinette II Court acknowledged the “wave of New
Federalism,” it narrowed Ohio’s commitment to the movement. The
Court stated that “where the provisions are similar and no persuasive
reason for a differing interpretation is presented, this court has
determined that protections afforded by Ohio’s Constitution are
coextensive with those provided by the United States Constitution.”91
The Court concluded that the language of article I, section 14 of the

82. Id. at 173.
83. Id. at 169.
84. State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1995) (Robinette I), rev’d, 516 U.S. 1157
(1996); State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio 1997) (Robinette II).
85. Robinette I, 653 N.E.2d at 698.
86. Id. at 699.
87. Robinette II, 685 N.E.2d at 765.
88. Id. at 765.
89. Ohio v. Robinette, 516 U.S. 1157, 1157 (1996).
90. Robinette II, 685 N.E.2d at 771.
91. Id. at 766.
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Ohio Constitution was virtually identical to the Fourth Amendment and
cited its history of interpreting the Ohio Constitution as affording the
same, and no greater, protection as the Fourth Amendment.92
The Ohio Supreme Court’s reluctance to robustly embrace Ohio
constitutional independence has not been limited to search-and-seizure
cases or even criminal law. In Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, the Court
declined an invitation to construe article I, section 11 of the Ohio
Constitution more broadly than the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution in order to protect free speech activities on privatelyowned property open to the public. 93 Similarly, in Simmons-Harris v.
Goff, the Court formally adopted the traditional Lemon v. Kurtzman
analysis,94 used to adjudicate federal Establishment Clause challenges,95
to decide a claim that the state’s school voucher program violated article
I, section 7 of the Ohio Constitution.96 In a nod to state constitutional
independence, however, the Court stated that it was adopting the Lemon
test “not because it is the federal constitutional standard, but rather
because the elements of the Lemon test are a logical and reasonable
method by which to determine whether a statutory scheme establishes
religion.”97 The Court “reserve[d] the right to adopt a different
constitutional standard pursuant to the Ohio Constitution, whether
because the federal constitutional standard changes or for any other
relevant reason.”98
A year later, the Court found a persuasive reason to assert Ohio
constitutional independence in a religious free exercise case, Humphrey
v. Lane.99 Wendall Humphrey was a Native American employed as a
92. Id. While the Robinette I case was on hiatus at the United States Supreme Court, the Ohio
Supreme Court issued its decision in State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole Bd., 661 N.E.2d 728
(Ohio 1996). The Court reversed a prior precedent from 1984 which held that under article I, section
14 of the Ohio Constitution, evidence obtained through an unreasonable or unlawful search and
seizure is inadmissible in a probation revocation proceeding. In Wright, the Court realigned its
position to conform to federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the majority Ohio rule that the
exclusion rule should not apply in probation revocation proceedings.
93. Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 626 N.E.2d 59, 60 (Ohio 1994).
94. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
95. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
96. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 208 (Ohio 1999) (“All men have a natural and
indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own conscience. No
person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or maintain any form of
worship, against his consent; and no preference shall be given, by law, to any religious society; nor
shall any interference with the rights of conscience be permitted.”)
97. Id. at 211.
98. Id. at 212.
99. Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (Ohio 2000).
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corrections officer at a state prison.100 Humphrey received notice that he
was to be terminated for refusing to cut his waist-length hair in order to
comply with a departmental grooming policy.101 His refusal to do so was
based upon his sincerely held religious beliefs - beliefs the department of
corrections had accommodated for years by allowing him to wear his
hair tucked neatly under his uniform hat.102 Humphrey had no viable
federal Free Exercise claim because, in 1990, the United States Supreme
Court had relaxed the standard for such claims by holding that strict
scrutiny was no longer required.103 Humphrey’s only viable choice was
to bring suit under article I, section 7 of the Ohio Constitution and to
convince the courts that the Ohio Constitution should continue to follow
the strict-scrutiny test and afford broader protection to religious freedom
than the new, federal constitutional floor.
Humphrey prevailed in the trial court but lost in the court of
appeals, where the Ninth District predicted that the Ohio Supreme Court
would transition to the new federal constitutional test and narrow the
protection afforded to religious free exercise.104 The Ohio Supreme
Court accepted the case for discretionary review and reversed, electing
to adhere to the long-held strict scrutiny standard, even for challenges to
generally applicable, religiously neutral laws and regulations, despite the
recent federal divergence.105 The Court analyzed the difference between
the rich language in article I, section 7 of the Ohio Constitution and the
abbreviated statement in the First Amendment and concluded that there
was a qualitative difference: the Ohio Constitution prohibits any
“interference with the rights of conscience,” while the First Amendment
concerns itself with laws that prohibit the free exercise of religion.106
Six years later, with Chief Justice O’Connor now a member of the
Court, Norwood was released. The Court reaffirmed its commitment to
Ohio’s constitutional independence in Norwood,107 but it did so with
little fanfare. Perhaps because the United States Supreme Court, in Kelo,
invited the state legislatures and state supreme courts to afford greater
100. Id. at 1041.
101. Id. at 1042.
102. Id. at 1041.
103. The strict scrutiny standard requires a state, seeking to justify a law that infringes upon
religious freedom, to demonstrate that the law employs the least restrictive means to further a
compelling state interest. In Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872
(1990), the Court held that a state law did not violate the federal Free Exercise Clause so long as the
law was religiously neutral and generally applicable.
104. Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1042.
105. Id. at 1043.
106. Id. at 1044.
107. Norwood, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115, at ¶ 65.
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protection to individual property rights by restricting public use
takings,108 the Court did not find it necessary to conduct a detailed
textual analysis (as it had done in Humphrey) or to otherwise justify its
divergence from the federal reconciliation of property rights and public
use takings. In effect, Norwood unsettles the presumption that federal
constitutional law is the dominant law to follow, absent some textually
based and persuasive reason to make a change. Norwood reinforces the
role of the Ohio Constitution as a truly independent instrument that may
be invoked to protect property and other fundamental rights and civil
liberties.
C.

Judicial Deference Cannot Bleed into Judicial Abdication

Chief Justice O’Connor came onto the Court at a point in time
when the Court’s decade-long struggle with the legislature over tort
reform and school funding had made “judicial activism” a popular
invective.109 Chief Justice O’Connor is a strong advocate of judicial
restraint and is quick to speak out when she sees the Court stepping out
from behind the bench or picking up the legislative pen.110 Yet, as
Norwood illustrates, the doctrine of “separation-of-powers,”111 which

108. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005).
109. The Court addressed the constitutionality of tort reform legislation six times over a period
spanning from 1991 to 2007 and, on all but the last occasion, found some aspect of tort reform law
unconstitutional. See Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 768 (Ohio 1991) (holding a cap on general
damages awarded for medical malpractice unconstitutional); Sorrell v. Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504,
508 (Ohio 1994) (holding the collateral benefits rule unconstitutional); Galayda v. Lake Hosp., 644
N.E.2d 298, 302 (Ohio 1994) (holding a statute requiring certain awards of tort damages to be
payable over time unconstitutional); Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397, 399 (Ohio
1994) (holding a statute allowing judge, not jury, to determine punitive damages unconstitutional);
Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 751 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999) (striking down Tort Reform Act
of 1987 in toto); Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St. 3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d
420, at ¶ 8 (upholding caps on non-economic damages and punitive damages enacted in 2005).
The school funding controversy commanded the Court’s attention from 1997 through 2002, during
which time the Court held Ohio’s school funding system unconstitutional twice. DeRolph v. State,
677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997); DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000). In 2001, the Court
found that changes enacted by the Legislature, with some on-the-spot judicial tweaking, finally
allowed the system to pass constitutional muster. DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 2001).
Nevertheless, in short order, the Court vacated that decision and reinstated the prior holding of
unconstitutionality. DeRolph v. State, 97 Ohio St. 3d 434, 2002-Ohio-675, 780 N.E.2d 529, at ¶¶
10-11.
110. See, e.g., Schussheim v. Schussheim, 137 Ohio St. 3d 133, 2013-Ohio-4529, 998 N.E.2d
446, at ¶ 18 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting); State ex rel. Gross v. Indus. Comm’n, 115 Ohio St. 3d
249, 2007-Ohio-4916, 874 N.E.2d 1162, at ¶ 33 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting).
111. “The separation-of-powers doctrine requires that each branch of government be permitted
to exercise its constitutional duties without interference from the other two branches of
government.” State ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 109 Ohio St. 3d 364, 2006-Ohio-1825, 848 N.E.2d 472, at
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extols judicial restraint and abhors judicial activism, is a two-way street.
And when it comes to constitutional interpretation, the Court is indeed
“Supreme” and has the rightfully dominant role in construing the
constitutional text, consistent with the separation-of-powers doctrine.
At its core, Norwood is an opinion about the separation of powers.
The Court spends considerable time and effort correcting what it viewed
as the error in cases holding that economic development alone is
sufficient to satisfy the public use requirement – an “artificial judicial
deference” to legislative determinations as to what is a sufficient public
use.112 The Court opines that, “[d]espite the relative reluctance of courts
to intervene in determinations that a sufficient public benefit supported
the taking, the separation-of-powers doctrine ‘would be unduly
restricted’ if the state could invoke the police power to virtually
immunize all takings from judicial review.”113 The opinion succinctly
captures the difference between the legislative and judicial roles in
redevelopment takings cases, stating that due deference is rightfully
given to a legislative factual finding that an area is blighted or
deteriorated, but that no such deference must be given to a legislative
determination that eliminating a deteriorating area is a valid public use
under article I, section 19 of the Ohio Constitution.114
As to the determination of the constitutionality of a taking, rather
than the need or rationale for the taking, the Court reaffirmed its
“traditional role as guardian of constitutional rights and limits.”115 The
Court declared the courts are the sole arbiters of the scope of eminent
domain appropriations and stated that “[j]udicial review is even more
imperative in cases in which the taking involves an ensuing transfer of
property to a private entity, where a novel theory of public use is
¶ 56. “While Ohio, unlike other jurisdictions, does not have a constitutional provision specifying the
concept of separation of powers, this doctrine is implicitly embedded in the entire framework of
those sections of the Ohio Constitution that define the substance and scope of powers granted to the
three branches of state government.” Id. at ¶ 55 (quoting South Euclid v. Jemison, 503 N.E.2d 136,
137-38 (Ohio 1986)).
112. Norwood, 2006-Ohio-3799 at ¶ 61. Scholarship has similarly criticized the Kelo opinion.
See Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of Deference in Judicial Review of Public Use Determinations, 39
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 243, 268-69 (2012); Kristi M. Burkard, Comment, No More Government
Theft of Property! A Call to Return to A Heightened Standard of Review After the United States
Supreme Court Decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 27 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 115, 119
(2005); Ashley J. Fuhrmeister, Note, In the Name of Economic Development: Reviving “Public
Use” as a Limitation on the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New London,
54 DRAKE L. REV. 171, 205 (2005).
113. Norwood, 2006-Ohio-3799 at ¶ 67 (quoting United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v.
Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 556-57 (1946) (Reed, J., concurring)).
114. Id. at ¶ 63.
115. Id. at ¶ 69.
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asserted, and in cases in which there is a showing of discrimination, bad
faith, impermissible financial gain, or other improper purpose.”116 In so
doing, the Court does not make a point of explicitly applying the
doctrine of separation of powers. Later in the opinion, however, the
Court takes the doctrine of separation-of-powers head on in a different
context.
Ohio’s eminent domain statute contained a provision, R.C. 163.19,
banning the issuance of stays and injunctions during appellate review of
an order allowing the taking.117 The statute reflects a strong legislative
preference for assuring the speedy culmination of necessary public
projects, including demolition projects, by allowing them to proceed
pending appellate review. The Court, however, held the statute’s nostay, anti-injunction provision was “an unconstitutional encroachment on
the judiciary’s constitutional and inherent authority.”118
The two discussions of the separation-of-powers doctrine in
Norwood have significance well beyond the support they give to the
Court’s case-specific holding. Norwood helps restore the luster of the
separation-of-powers doctrine after it was tarnished in the era of tort
reform and school funding debates. Once thought to have become a tool
for judicial activism, the doctrine of separation of powers is now
described as the “first, and defining, principle of a free constitutional
government” and a principle of restraint and respect intended to protect
the integrity and independence of all three branches of government.119
Chief Justice O’Connor continued the restoration of the doctrine of
separation of powers in State v. Bodyke.120 In that case, the Court struck
down a provision in the Adam Walsh Act, which required the attorney
general to reclassify sex offenders who had been classified by court
order under the prior Megan’s Law.121 The Court held that the provision
violated the separation-of-powers doctrine because it impermissibly
instructed the executive branch to review prior judicial decisions.122
Chief Justice O’Connor’s opinion, joined fully by Justices Lundberg
Stratton and Lanzinger, reviews the purpose of the doctrine as it has
been viewed over time.123 Importantly, however, it also reminds the
116. Id. at ¶ 74.
117. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 163.19 (West, Westlaw through Files 1 to 140 and Statement
Issue 1of the 130th GA (2013-2014)).
118. Norwood, 2006-Ohio-3799 at ¶ 125.
119. State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St. 3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, at ¶ 39.
120. Id. at ¶¶ 39-54.
121. Id. at ¶¶ 60-61.
122. Id. at ¶ 60.
123. Id. at ¶¶ 39-53.
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public, and perhaps the courts, that the Court’s vigilance in protecting
the separation of powers “is not borne of self-reverence” but rather is
necessary to “protect the borders separating the three branches in order
to ensure the security and harmony of the government.”124
The Bodyke opinion not only draws favorably on Norwood but also,
surprisingly, on the Court’s controversial opinion in Ohio Academy of
Trial Lawyers v. Sheward.125 Sheward was at the epicenter of the
firestorm over tort reform and was branded by some as a case of extreme
judicial activism because of its invocation of a novel form of public
interest standing to allow trial lawyers to seek an immediate review, and
invalidation, of tort reform legislation by the Ohio Supreme Court.126 By
citing Sheward as well as Norwood, Chief Justice O’Connor helped put
the Court’s past behind it and soothe the controversy that had
surrounded the separation-of-powers doctrine.
The opinion reminds us that the judiciary “has both the power and
the solemn duty to determine the constitutionality and validity of acts by
other branches of government” and that courts must “‘jealously guard
the judicial power against encroachment from the other two branches of
government and . . . conscientiously perform our constitutional duties
and continue our most precious legacy.’”127 Through Norwood and
Bodyke, Chief Justice O’Connor has made clear that the separation of
powers is not simply about judicial power or judicial restraint but also
focuses on mutual respect for the proper and necessary roles of all three
branches of government.
D.

The Counterpoise of Judicial Restraint is Legislative Clarity

Having decided that an economic or financial benefit alone is
insufficient to satisfy the public use requirement, the Court turned to the
question of whether the takings could be justified based on the finding
that the Horneys’ neighborhood was a “deteriorating area” or whether
that term was too vague as a takings standard.128 Norwood’s treatment of
124. Id. at ¶ 47.
125. Id. at ¶ 43 (quoting summary of separation of powers from Sheward majority opinion).
126. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Blake, Note, State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v.
Sheward: The Extraordinary Application of Extraordinary Writs and Other Issues; The Case That
Never Should Have Been, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 433, 434 (“The majority in State ex rel. Ohio
Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward moved jurisdictional and procedural mountains to address the
unjusticiable issue of tort reform. In so doing, Ohio’s highest court egregiously ignored wellestablished jurisdictional rules laid down by the court itself, decades of procedural formalities, and a
stream of consistent case law dating back to colonial America.”).
127. Bodyke, 2010-Ohio-2424 at ¶ 46.
128. Norwood, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115, at ¶¶ 90-104.
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the property owners’ separate void-for-vagueness claim is also
noteworthy.129
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is a well-accepted principle of due
process that demands “the state provide meaningful standards in its
laws.”130 Its purpose is to ensure that the citizenry has fair notice of the
conduct proscribed and that laws will not be arbitrarily enforced.131 The
doctrine, however, is rarely invoked successfully. The Ohio Supreme
Court has reviewed void-for-vagueness claims in only 58 cases,132 and it
has held a state law or municipal ordinance unconstitutionally vague in
only nine cases. Seven of these cases involved criminal statutes or
ordinances.133 Prior to Norwood, the Court struck down a civil law on
vagueness grounds only once.134
Norwood recognizes that the vagueness doctrine is usually applied
in criminal law or First Amendment cases but holds that “neither the
rationale underlying the doctrine nor the case law interpreting it suggests
that it should not be applied in any case in which the statute challenged
substantially affects other fundamental constitutional rights.”135 The
Court also holds that a more stringent or heightened test for vagueness
will apply when a legislative enactment affects a constitutionally
protected right, rather than merely economic or non-fundamental
interests.136
Applying a heightened standard of review, the Court found that the
City ordinance was unconstitutionally vague in its effort to assert the
power of eminent domain over “deteriorating areas.”137 The Court
acknowledged that the Norwood Code set forth a “fairly comprehensive
array of conditions that purport to describe a ‘deteriorating area’” but
129. Id. at ¶ 81.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. As revealed by a Lexis search using “void w/10 vague!”.
133. See City of Akron v. Rowland, 618 N.E.2d 138, 148-49 (Ohio 1993) (municipal loitering
ordinance); City of South Euclid v. Richardson, 551 N.E.2d 606, 606 (Ohio 1990) (ordinance
prohibiting brothels); City of Columbus v. New, 438 N.E.2d 1155, 1155 (Ohio 1982) (falsification
ordinance); State v. Young, 406 N.E.2d 499, 500 (Ohio 1980) (organized crime statute); City of
Columbus v. Rogers, 324 N.E.2d 563, 563 (Ohio 1973) (ordinance prohibiting cross dressing); City
of Cincinnati v. Taylor, 303 N.E.2d 886, 887 (Ohio 1973) (anti-prowling ordinance); Dragelevich v.
City of Youngstown, 197 N.E.2d 334, 334 (Ohio 1964) (prohibition on exhibiting gambling
machinery).
134. State ex rel. Miller v. Brown, 150 N.E.2d 46, 48 (Ohio 1958) (holding state election
statute unconstitutional because it was “so confused, vague, unworkable and discriminatory that it
amounted to no effective legislation”).
135. Norwood, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115, at ¶ 87.
136. Id. at ¶ 88.
137. Id. at ¶ 104.
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noted that the described conditions – e.g., incompatible land uses, lack
of adequate parking, faulty street arrangement, obsolete platting, small
front yards – “are endemic to urban neighborhoods, including some of
the most exclusive in America, e.g. Beacon Hill in Boston, Greenwich
Village and Tribeca in lower Manhattan and Nob Hill in San
Francisco.”138 In the end, the Court concluded that the Norwood Code’s
definition of a “deteriorating area” was a “standardless standard” that
“offer[ed] so little guidance in its application that it is almost barren of
any practical meaning.”139
The new life Norwood gives to the void-for-vagueness doctrine is
consistent with the opinion’s earlier views on the scope of judicial
review and separation of powers. In essence, the Court recognized that
the quid pro quo for judicial restraint is legislative precision. Although
the Court is committed to enforcing statutes and ordinances as written,
the legislative standard must be clear, especially where the law impacts
fundamental rights that could be lost through arbitrary enforcement.
While Norwood has not, and likely will not, spark a new trend of
successful vagueness challenges, it may have a palliative effect on
legislative efforts to curtail fundamental civil rights and a positive effect
on the clarity of new laws and regulations in all areas.
III. CONCLUSION
Chief Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Norwood is significant,
without more, for its resolution of legally and emotionally charged
question regarding the reach of the power of eminent domain. This case
about taking, however, gives us much more. In Norwood, Chief Justice
O’Connor and the Court deliver an important, modern recalibration of
fundamental principles of Ohio constitutional analysis. Thus, the broader
significance of Norwood lies in its strong affirmation of New Judicial
Federalism and the importance of the Ohio Constitution as an
independent source of possible greater protection of fundamental rights,
its firm articulation of the separation of powers doctrine rooted in the
doctrine’s importance to free constitutional governance, and its
expansion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to protect fundamental
rights in a civil context not involving free speech.

138.
139.

Id. at ¶ 93 n.13.
Id. at ¶¶ 97-98.
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